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European Union Allowances (EUAs) traded since 2005 as part of the
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). First, the presence of two structural
changes on April, 2006 following the disclosure of 2005 veriﬁed emissions
and on October, 2006 following the European Commission announcement
of stricter Phase II allocation allow to isolate distinct fundamentals evolv-
ing overtime. The results extend previous literature by showing that spot
prices react not only to other energy markets and temperatures, but also
to economic activity within the main sectors covered by the EU ETS such
as proxied by sectoral production indices. Besides, the sub-period decom-
position of the pilot phase gives a better grasp of institutional and market
events that drive allowance price changes.
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11 Introduction
Since January 1, 2005 each carbon ton emitted in Europe by about 11,500
energy intensive plants has been priced. The European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS), which covers up to 46% of European CO2 emissions, aims
at helping Member States to achieve compliance with their commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol during 2008-2012. While International Emissions Trading
(IET) allows trading between governments starting in 2008, the EU ETS breaks
down emissions trading to the company level. Its main objective consists in
giving incentives to industrials to reduce emissions and to contribute to the
promotion of low carbon technologies and energy eﬃciency among CO2 emitting
plants. Most important polluting entities manage their compliance between
their allocation and annual veriﬁed emissions by buying or selling European
Union Allowances (EUAs) to emit a ton of carbon. At the end of the ﬁrst
commitment period on December 31, 2007, the European Commission (EC)
intends to provide decision makers with an allowance price to lead to emissions
abatements.
Yet the ﬁrst disclosure of 2005 veriﬁed emissions on April, 2006 revealing
the net short/long position1 of each plant was accompanied by a sudden al-
lowance price collapse, and tends towards zero thereafter (see Figure 1). This
price path therefore suggests that trading was based on heterogenous anticipa-
tions prior to information disclosure. Within 2005-2007, diﬀerent fundamentals
seem to co-exist before and after the compliance break. Thus, understanding
price formation mechanisms when creating such a market appears of critical
importance. In this context, the question we address is the following: which
factors contribute to shape the price formation of this newly European Union
Allowances market?
This article analyses the EU ETS during its pilot phase (2005-2007) by
focusing on the empirical relationship between CO2 price changes2 and its main
fundamentals. Springer (2003)’s review of theoretical models and Christiansen
et al. (2005) lead to the identiﬁcation of the carbon prices main drivers being
economic growth, energy prices, weather condition and policy issues. Their
potential impacts are analysed in this paper.
The total number of allowances is determined by Member States negotiating
with industrials and after validation by the EC. As soon as the ﬁrst National
Allocation Plans3 (NAPs) were drafted, there was a concern of allowance over-
supply during the EU ETS pilot phase. Academic and market agents usually
agree that the information revelation by simultaneous countries of lower than
expected 2005 veriﬁed emissions is the main reason behind the fall of CO2 prices
by more than 50% that occurred on April, 2006.
2As pointed out by Ellerman and Buchner (2007), this allowances oversupply
argument shall be balanced by the analysis of net short/long positions at the
installation level. To the best of our knowledge, empirical studies have not
yet studied the eﬀects of sectoral economic activity covered by the EU ETS
on CO2 prices. As industrials are able to inﬂuence the market price by their
abatement decisions, we intend to include their potential eﬀects in our analysis.
The inclusion of the sectors production variables is all the more important as the
April, 2006 break in the EUA spot price may be explained by wrong projections
at the sectoral level (Grubb and Ferrario, 2006).
Compared to previous literature, our contribution is threefold. First, we
show statistical evidence of structural changes following the disclosure of new
information about the net short/long position at the installation level during
Phase I and the EC decision to enforce stricter NAPs during Phase II. Second,
the role played by sectoral economic activity in the EU ETS is highlighted. By
doing so, this article extends, among other contributions, Mansanet-Bataller
et al. (2007) by emphasising other determinants of carbon prices than energy
prices and climatic events. Third, we ﬁnd that those fundamentals vary between
periods, and that EUA spot prices react to energy and weather variables during
some time periods whereas during other periods, institutional decisions seem to
have more inﬂuence than the expected drivers. This evidence leads us to the
conclusion that allowance prices react to distinct fundamentals within this ﬁrst
commitment period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
main drivers of EUA prices. Section 3 estimates the relationship between the
daily carbon price changes and energy commodities, meteorological factors and
industrial production. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Main drivers of EUA prices
New commodity markets generally need time to achieve real price discovery. As
shown in Figure 1, the EUA price pattern experienced a strong volatility during
the ﬁrst two years. Beginning at 8= C on January 1, 2005 EUA prices increased
to around 30= C on July 2005, ﬂuctuated during the following six months in
the range of 20-25= C, then rose to 30= C until the end of April. On the last
week of April, 2006, prices collapsed when operators disclosed 2005 veriﬁed
emissions data and showed the scheme was oversupplied. After this considerable
adjustment by 54% in four days, EUA prices moved in the range from 15 to
20= C until October, 2006. From this date, the EU ETS is sending two price
signals responding to diﬀerent dynamics. Phase I prices are declining towards
zero whereas Phase II prices are increasing to 20= C primarily due to the EC
3which has reaﬃrmed its will to enforce tighter targets. On April, 2007, veriﬁed
emissions were again below the 2006 yearly allocation. The EUA spot price
seems to react to this new information by moving towards zero. Phase I EUA
futures and spot prices are strong correlated whereas EUA Futures prices for
delivery in the Phase II are totally disconnected since October, 2006.
Figure 1: EUA spot prices from July 1, 2005 to April 30, 2007
Source: Powernext carbon
While allowance supply is ﬁxed by each Member States through NAPs, al-
lowance demand is function of the level of CO2 emissions whose production
depends on a large number of factors such as fuel (brent, coal and natural gas)
and power (electricity) prices, weather conditions (temperatures, rainfall and
wind speed) and economic growth. Until now, the empirical literature focused
only on the ﬁrst two factors.
According to previous literature, energy prices are the most important drivers
of carbon prices due to the ability of power generators to switch between their
fuel inputs (Kanen, 2006; Christiansen et al., 2005; Bunn and Fezzi, 2007; Con-
very and Redmond, 2007). This option to switch from natural gas to coal in
their inputs represents an abatement opportunity to reduce CO2 emissions in
the short term. High (low) energy prices contribute to an increase (decrease)
of carbon prices. This logic is described by Kanen (2006) who identiﬁes brent
prices as the main driver of natural gas prices which, in turn, aﬀect power prices
and ultimately carbon prices. Power operators also pay close attention to dark
and spark spreads and the diﬀerence between them. The dark spread is the
theoretical proﬁt that a coal-ﬁred power plant makes from selling a unit of elec-
tricity having purchased the fuel required to produce that unit of electricity. The
4spark spread refers to the equivalent for natural gas-ﬁred power plants. With
the introduction of carbon costs, dark and spark spreads need to be corrected by
EUA prices and thus become respectively clean dark and clean spark spreads.
The equilibrium between these clean spreads represents the carbon price above
which it becomes proﬁtable for an electric power producer to switch from coal to
natural gas, and below which it is beneﬁcial to switch from natural gas to coal.
As long as the market carbon price is below this switching price, coal plants are
more proﬁtable than gas plants - even after taking carbon costs into account.
This switching price is most sensitive to changes in natural gas prices than to
coal prices changes (Kanen, 2006). These three proﬁtability indicators are used
to determine the preferred fuel in power generation.
By inﬂuencing energy demand, weather conditions may have an impact
on EUA prices. To the best of our knowledge, only Mansanet-Bataller et al.
(2007) show empirical evidence of the impact of weather variables on CO2 price
changes. Yet numerous studies have already highlighted the eﬀect of climate on
energy prices4. These studies indicate the relationship between temperature and
electricity demand is non-linear. Indeed, only both temperature increases and
decreases, beyond certain thresholds, can lead to increases in power demand.
Warmer summers increase the demand for air conditioning, electricity, and the
derived demand for coal. Colder winters increase the demand for natural gas
and heating fuel. As a result of increasing (decreasing) their output, power gen-
erators will see their CO2 emissions increase (decrease) which should in return
increase (decrease) the demand for allowances.
Some factors are missing in the recent empirical literature of carbon price
fundamentals. The overall cap stringency is function of initial allocation but
also of economic activity within sectors covered by the EU ETS (Reinaud, 2007).
First, political and institutional features impact on the carbon price discovery.
As explained above, the gap between initial allocation to industrials and their
business-as-usual emission forecasts was problematic. On April, 2006, ﬁrst dis-
closures of some EU Member States revealing longs positions caused a sharp fall
in the carbon prices. Second, the toughness of the emissions cap depends on the
industrial growth in the sectors covered by the EU ETS. These sectors covered
by the EU ETS include combustion plants, oil reﬁneries, coke ovens, iron and
steel plants, and factories producing cement, gass, lime, brick, ceramics, pulp
and paper5. More precisely, the emissions net short/long position needs to be
balanced with the yearly compliance and the activity trend. If a sector com-
bines a net short (long) position and an increasing (declining) activity trend,
then ﬁrms in this sector are net buyers (sellers) of allowances and the impact on
the allowance price shall be positive (negative). The net position of each sector
for the 2005 and 2006 compliance is drawn from the CITL administered by the
5EC, according to Trotignon (2007) who computed veriﬁed emissions data by
sectors and countries.
Section 3 details how to capture those relevant determinants in our models.
3 Data and Econometric Speciﬁcation
We present ﬁrst data for carbon and energy prices, weather events and sectoral
production used to determine EUA price fundamentals and sub-periods on which
fundamentals seem to change. Second, econometric speciﬁcations are detailed.
3.1 Data
Since we are mostly interested in the institutional features of the EU ETS pilot
phase6, we conduct an analysis of the EUA spot price which is related to daily
transactions. Moreover, installations have not, a priori, a daily or hourly need
of emission allowances, but they only need to hold allowances matching their
emissions levels to their allocation once a year (Reinaud, 2007). Therefore, we
do not use intraday or day ahead energy prices but futures Month Ahead prices
to provide a better analysis of the EUA spot price due to changes of industrial
expectations7.
3.1.1 The carbon price
The EUA price is determined on several markets, i.e. the over-the-counter
(OTC), spot and futures markets. The most liquid market is the OTC market.
Transactions on this OTC market are usually operated by industrials or bro-
kers. Consequently price data is conﬁdential or available through commercial
energy consultancies. The most liquid futures market is the European Climate
Exchange and the most liquid spot market is Powernext Carbon. We use the
daily EUA spot price (Pt in = C/tonne of CO2) negotiated from July 1st, 2005
to April 30, 2007 on Powernext carbon. The sample period starts at the launch
of the Powernext market place and ends at a time when the EUA price path
tends towards zero.
3.1.2 Structural breaks
As explained above, the EUA price break occurred on April, 2006 following the
report of 2005 veriﬁed emissions. The dataset is split in subsamples to get rid
of the inﬂuence of these extreme price changes.
First, the unit root test by Lee and Strazicich (2003)8 with two structural
breaks has been run on the EUA ﬁrst natural logarithm price series. Their
6procedure characterizes the "compliance break" period as going from April 25
to June 23, 2006. This period is excluded from our regressions, except for
the whole sample. We therefore statistically identify two main periods in our
dataset: "before the compliance break" and "after the compliance break". In
April, ﬁrst disclosures of the Netherlands, Czech Republic, France, and Spain
revealing longs positions cause the sharp price break. On May 15th 2006, the
oﬃcial communication by the EC conﬁrmed veriﬁed emissions were about 80
million tons or 4% lower than the yearly allocation (Ellerman and Buchner,
2007).
Second, the unit root test by Lee and Strazicich (2001) with one structural
break9 has been run. It proofs statistically the EUA price adjustment when
the EC announces the stricter validation of NAPs II10. That is why we also
identify two sub-periods: "June, 2006 - October, 2006" and "October, 2006 -
April, 2007". These breaks are included in our regressions using two dummy
variables. break1 is a dummy referring to the period after the structural break
on April, 2006 and break2 is a dummy reﬂecting the period after the EUA price
adjustment on October, 2006.
These breakdowns by main periods on the one hand and sub-periods on the
other hand are summarized in Figure 1.
3.1.3 Energy prices
On energy markets, the following price series are used. The oil price (brent
in $/baril) is the daily brent crude futures Month Ahead price negotiated on
the Intercontinental Futures Exchange. To ensure that all energy price series
are traded with the same currency, the oil price series is converted to euro
using the daily exchange rate provided by the European Central Bank. The
natural gas (ngas in = C/Mwh) is the daily futures Month Ahead natural gas
price negotiated on Zeebrugge Hub. The price of coal (coal in = C/t) is the daily
coal futures Month Ahead price CIF ARA.
During 2005-07, natural gas prices exhibit strong volatility compared to
coal prices. During the winter 2005, natural gas prices soared to 50= C/Mwh
and steadily declined afterwards to 20= C/Mwh during 2006 and to 10= C/Mwh
during the ﬁrst quarter 2007. The competitiveness of natural gas compared to
coal therefore improved during 2006 and the ﬁrst quarter 2007 compared to the
winter 2005.
The price of electricity Powernext (elec in = C/Mwh) is the contract of futures
Month Ahead Base. To take account of abatement options for energy industrials
and relative fuel prices, three speciﬁc spreads are included11. First, the Clean
dark spread, clean dark spread expressed in = C/MWh, represents the diﬀerence
7Figure 2: ICE Brent Month Ahead prices, Zeebrugge Natural gas Month Ahead,
CIF ARA coal Month Ahead prices from July 1, 2005 to April 30, 2007
Source: Reuters
Figure 3: Powernext Futures Month Ahead Base prices, Clean spark spread,
Clean dark spread from July 1, 2005 to April 30, 2007
Source: Powernext, Tendances carbone from Caisse des Dépôts
between the price of electricity at peak hours and the price of coal used to gen-
erate that electricity, corrected for the energy output of the coal plant. Second,
the Clean Spark Spread, clean spark spread expressed in = C/MWh, represents
the diﬀerence between the price of electricity at peak hours and the price of nat-
8ural gas used to generate that electricity, corrected for the energy output of the
gas-ﬁred plant. During 2005-06, the use of coal appeared more proﬁtable than
gas. Since the beginning of 2007, the diﬀerence between clean dark and spark
spreads has been narrowing. This situation encourages consequently electric
companies to decrease the use of coal to the proﬁt of natural gas.
Figure 4: CO2 spot prices and Switch CO2 prices from July 1, 2005 to April 30,
2007
Source: Powernext, Tendances carbone from Caisse des Dépôts
Third, the switch price of CO2, expressed in = C/MWh, is used as a proxy
of the abatement cost. Figure 4 shows on July 2005 and since February 2007,
CO2 spot prices and the switch price of CO2 were very closed suggesting at this
carbon price level Emissions abatements may have occurred.
Usual unit root tests (ADF, PP, KPSS) are performed for all price series.
All of them are characterized by a unit root and then converted to stationary
taking ﬁrst natural logarithm diﬀerences. When tests are applied on series in
ﬁrst diﬀerences, they are found to be stationary. In other words, all prices series
are integrated of order 1 (I(1))12.
Following Helfand et al. (2006), energy variables are constructed by com-
puting "one-step ahead" forecast errors for all price series. By doing so, we
aim at capturing the role of market uncertainty and modelling new information
from unexpected changes in markets and conditions that might aﬀect the CO2
market.
93.1.4 Temperatures variables
According to previous literature, our investigation focuses on the most impor-
tant dimension of weather: extremely hot and cold degree-days. The inﬂuence
of precipitation, wind speed, and other climatic conditions on energy demand
is left for further research due to a lack of data availability at the European
level. Weather variables are constructed by using the daily data of Powernext
Weather indices, expressed in ◦C, for four countries: Spain, France, Germany
and United Kingdom. These indices are computed as the temperature average
at the representative regional weather station weighted by regional population.
The Tendances Carbone European temperature index is also used. It is equal
to the average of national temperature indices provided by Powernext weighted
by the share of each NAP in the previous four countries.
For each of these ﬁve temperature series, the deviation from their seasonal
average13 is computed . Two kinds of quantitative weather variables are then
obtained: the temperature value and the deviation from their seasonal average
expressed in absolute value.
To take into account extreme weather conditions, two kinds of dummy vari-
ables are computed. First, following Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), we cal-
culate the quintiles from the temperature series and use the lower and upper
quintiles to construct two dummy variables representing extremely cold and hot
days, termed as respectively Tempext5 and Tempext95. Second, we depart from
previous literature by constructing dummy variables representing some monthly
extreme weather events which could have an impact on CO2 price changes.
After computing and comparing for each country the monthly temperatures
average on the full period and its deviation from their seasonal average, the
following extreme weather events are selected as dummy variables : July, 2005
(abnormal hot season in Spain), January and February, 2006 (a relatively cold
winter in Europe), July, 2006 (relatively hot in Europe), September and Oc-
tober, 2006 (hotter than seasonal averages) and January and February, 2007
(winter hotter than seasonal averages). We want to test the non-linearity of
the relationship between temperatures and carbon price changes highlighted in
previous literature. Thus, these latter extreme events dummies, the tempera-
ture series and the absolute value of their deviation from their seasonal average
are used to specify the eﬀect of temperatures during extreme events. In par-
ticular, two interaction variables are computed: the cross products between
our ﬁve extreme weather events dummy variables and either temperature or
the absolute value of their deviation from their seasonal average. For instance
Win06 = winter2006 ∗ Temp_AbsDeviation is the product of the dummy vari-
able characteristic of January and February, 2006 (winter2006) and the absolute
10Figure 5: European temperature index: its deviation from their seasonal average
Source: Powernext Weather indices, Tendances carbone from Caisse des Dépôts.
value of the deviation from its mean value of the European temperature index
(Temp_AbsDeviation).
3.1.5 Sector indices
EUA prices may be aﬀected by the economic activity of the various sectors
covered by the EU ETS. Indeed, economic growth has a major impact on CO2
emissions and therefore on allowances demand and supply from covered instal-
lations. Industrial sectors which result in higher production growth over 2005-
07 than their baseline projections are expected to be net buyers of allowances.
Conversely, industrial sectors which result in lower production growth than their
baseline projections are expected to be net sellers of allowances. Graphs of sec-
toral net short/long positions during the compliance periods 2005 and 2006 are
given in Figures 6 and 7. The data covers Member States which account for
three quarters of allowances distributed during the ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS:
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United-Kingdom.
Monthly industrial production indices are collected from Eurostat14 for the
paper and board, iron and steel, coke ovens, chemical, glass, cement and com-
bustion15 industries. At the aggregated level, data are obtained for the EU 27
and the Eurozone. At the country level, data are gathered for most industrial
sectors in France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK which account for
three quarters of allowances distributed during the ﬁrst phase of the EU ETS.
These data are then resampled to convert monthly indices to daily frequency16.
11Figure 6: Sectoral Short/Long Positions during 2005 compliance by Member
State
Source: Trotignon (2007)




We progress incrementally by ﬁrst verifying in an ”Energy model” the role played
by energy variables on EUA price changes. Second, temperature variables are
added to this ”Energy model” . Third, sectoral production indices are included
12in the ”Energy and temperatures model” . Note that adding step-by-step tem-
perature variables and production indices to the ”base model” also serves as a
robustness check for estimates. This estimation strategy is repeated for the full
period, the two main periods and the two sub-periods statistically identiﬁed in
section 3.1.2.
3.2.1 The relationship between carbon prices and energy variables
Equation (1) (eq.(1)) summarizes the ”energy model”:
pt = αi + βi(L)pt + χibreak1 + δibreak2 + φi(L)brentt + ϕi(L)ngast
+ γi(L)coalt + ηi(L)switcht + ιi(L)elect + κi(L)clean darkt
+ λi(L)clean sparkt + i,t
(1)
where t is the time period under consideration and i = {full period, "before
the compliance break", "after the compliance break", "June, 2006 - October,
2006", "October, 2006 - April, 2007"} corresponding either to the full period or
the two main periods or the two sub-periods, pt is the ﬁrst log-diﬀerenced EUA
price series, break1 is a dummy characteristic of the period after the structural
break on April, 2006, break2 is a dummy related to the period after October,
2006, brentt the Brent price series, ngast is the Natural gas price series, coalt is
the Coal price series, switcht is the Switch price series, elect is the Electricity
price series, clean darkt is the Clean Dark price series, clean sparkt is the Clean
Spark price series and i,t is the error term. All energy price series have been
transformed to ”one-step ahead” forecast errors as explained above. L is the lag
operator such that L Xt = Xt−n where n is an integer and polynomes such as
(L)X are lag polynomials.
We turn to the next step of our empirical analysis by taking account of
temperatures besides the ”energy model”.
3.2.2 The inclusion of temperatures
First, methodology followed by Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) is applied by
including extreme temperature dummy variables using upper and lower quin-
tiles:
pt = αi + βi(L)pt + χibreak1 + δibreak2 + φi(L)brentt + ϕi(L)ngast
+ γi(L)coalt + ηi(L)switcht + ιi(L)elect + κi(L)clean darkt
+ λi(L)clean sparkt + ΘiTemp + µiTempext5 + νiTempex95 + i,t
(2)
where Temp is the European temperature index published by Tendances
Carbone, Tempext5 and Tempext95 are dummy variables characteristic of re-
13spectively the lower and the upper quintile drawn from this index. Other vari-
ables are explained in eq.(1).
Second, we depart from previous literature by introducing interaction vari-
ables explained in section 3.1.4. Consequently, the following equation is intro-
duced:
pt = αi + βi(L)pt + χibreak1 + δibreak2 + φi(L)brentt + ϕi(L)ngast
+ γi(L)coalt + ηi(L)switcht + ιi(L)elect + κi(L)clean darkt
+ λi(L)clean sparkt + oiJul05 + θiWin06 + ϑiJul06
+ ρiSepoct06 + σiWin07 + i,t
(3)
where Jul05 is the cross product of the dummy variable characteristic of
July, 2005 and the absolute value of the deviation from its seasonal average
of the Spain national temperatures index ; Win06 is the cross product of the
dummy variable characteristic of January and February, 2006 and the absolute
value of the deviation from its seasonal average of the European temperature
index; Jul06 is the cross product of the dummy variable characteristic of July,
2006 and the absolute value of the deviation from its seasonal average of the Eu-
ropean temperature index; Sepoct06 is the cross product of the dummy variable
characteristic of September and October, 2006 and the absolute value of the
deviation from its seasonal average of the European temperature index; Win07
is the cross product of the dummy variable characteristic of January and Febru-
ary, 2007 and the absolute value of the deviation from its seasonal average of
the European temperature index. Other variables are explained in eq.(1).
3.2.3 The inclusion of sectoral production indices
The third step consists in adding sectoral production indices to the ”energy
and temperatures model” (eq.(2) and (3)). Since we depart from the previous
literature concerning the inclusion of weather variables, we choose to add our
sectoral production indices variables not in eq.(2) but in eq.(3):
pt = αi + βi(L)pt + χibreak1 + δibreak2 + φi(L)brentt + ϕi(L)ngast
+ γi(L)coalt + ηi(L)switcht + ιi(L)elect + κi(L)clean darkt
+ λi(L)clean sparkt + oiJul05 + θiWin06 + ϑiJul06 + ρiSepoct06
+ σiWin07 + ςicementt,j + τichemt,j + υicoket,j + ωielecgast,j
+ ξiglasst,j + ψimetalt,j + ζipapert,j + i,t
(4)
where cementt,j is the cement production index in country j = {EU27, Ger-
many, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, UK} which applies for all sectors; chemt,j
14is the production index in the chemicals sector; coket,j is the production index
in the coke ovens sector; elecgast,j is the production index in the combustion
sector (i.e. heating from electricity and gas); glasst,j is the glass production
index; metalt,j is the production index in the iron and steel sector and papert,j
is the paper production index.
The next section presents results of these diﬀerent sets of regressions.
4 Results and Interpretation
Full period results for eq.(1), (2), (3) and (4) are ﬁrst presented in section 4.1
followed by subsequent main periods (sections 4.2 and 4.3) and sub-periods
(sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2) results. Descriptive statistics may be found in the
Appendix (Table 1). The quality of regressions is veriﬁed through the following
diagnostic tests: the simple R-squared, the adjusted R-squared, the p-value of
the F-test statistic (F −Stat), the Durbin-Watson statistic (D.W), the p-value
of the Breush-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lagrange Multiplier test (LM), the p-
value of the White heteroskedasticity test (Whitetest), the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Criterion (SC). Despite heteroskedasticity as
shown by the White test, we comment coeﬃcient estimates obtained by OLS es-
timator with a Newey-West procedure (NW OLS) rather than GARCH(1,1) es-
timates since they yield similar results. When there is evidence of heteroskedas-




Table 3, row (1) shows results for eq.(1). Both the adjusted R-squared and
the R-squared are included between 34% and 35.5%, and, as judged by the F-
test P-value, the joint signiﬁcance of results is accepted at the 1% signiﬁcance
level.
Brent and switch variables are not statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level. The
former result is consistent with Kanen (2006) who stated that brent might
aﬀect EUA price changes through the natural gas price. The latter result is
counter-intuitive since the switch variable does not aﬀect EUA prices unlike
coal and natural gas and may be explained by a multicollinearity problem.
First, among signiﬁcant fuel variables, natural gas and spark impact pos-
itively EUA price changes, whereas coal and dark have negative coeﬃcients.
The EU ETS was launched at a time where energy prices were at high lev-
els. The natural gas coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant at 1%. High levels
15of natural gas lead power operators to realise a switching of their fuel from gas
to coal. Natural gas price got higher from October 2005 to April 2006 and
thereby inﬂuenced positively the EUA price. Spark aﬀects EUA price changes
with a positive coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at 10%. During the two years, dark stays
above spark indicating burning coal is more proﬁtable than natural gas, which
increases allowances demand. As the most CO2-intensive variable, coal plays a
negative role on carbon price changes at 5%. The rationale behind this analysis
is that when confronted to a rise of the price of coal relative to other energy
markets, ﬁrms have an incentive to adapt their energy mix towards less CO2-
intensive energy sources, which conducts to less need of EUAs. Carbon price
changes are positively aﬀected by the electricity variable. Notwithstanding the
power sector was endowed with more than 50% of EUAs, it must be stressed it
also was the most constrained sector during the allocation process.
Second, concerning structural change dummies, only the April, 2006 struc-
tural break (break1) is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%. The institutional break
that occurred following the ﬁrst report of 2005 veriﬁed emissions is far more im-
portant than the October, 2006 break. In the ﬁrst case, a sudden price collapse
occurs with most of the adjustment being made in four days, while in the second
case a lengthy downward carbon price adjustment is observed. This situation
may explain why only break1 is statistically signiﬁcant on the full period. This
analysis is conﬁrmed by the Chow’s test of structural change (Table 2 in the
Appendix) which indicates statistical evidence for the two breakpoints.
Energy and temperatures model
Table 3, row (2a) shows results for eq.(2). Note the stability of energy
variables coeﬃcients between the two models proofs the robustness of our results.
This comment applies in the remainder of the paper. Neither Tempext5 nor
Tempext95 are statistically signiﬁcant at 10%. It seems to indicate there is no
eﬀect of extremely cold or hot days on CO2 price changes, which is surprising
when compared with previous literature. Still more counter-intuitive is the
negative sign of Tempext95. When there is extremely cold weather, the use
of heating is larger, leading to an increase in energy consumption that should
provoke allowance price raising as a result of larger CO2 emissions (Mansanet-
Bataller et al., 2007).
Equation (3) estimates (row (2b)) provide ﬁrst elements of explanation. Only
win07 is signiﬁcant and its coeﬃcient is negative. Notice that the coeﬃcient
of win06 is positive, even if this variable is not signiﬁcant at 10%. In relation
to eq.(1) (row (1)), the adjusted R-sqared increases from 34.17% to 35.58%;
the AIC and the SC both decrease. Therefore, the ”Base model and weather”
is more relevant to explain CO2 price changes. Other weather variables are
16not signiﬁcant at 10%: extremely hot days do not seem to impact allowance
price levels. Moreover, each of the ﬁve temperature series have been included
as likely regressors and none of them were statistically signiﬁcant. We also
tried to replace the win06 variable (the win07 variable) by the cross product of
the dummy variable characteristic of January and February, 2006 (January and
February, 2007) and the European temperature index, instead of its deviation
from its seasonal average expressed in absolute value, but these latter variables
were not signiﬁcant at 10%.
By combining these two results, we deduce two main conclusions. First,
we retrieve previous literature results which show the non-linearity of the rela-
tionship between temperatures and carbon price changes. Second, we take this
analysis one step further by showing that deviations from seasonal average mat-
ter more than temperature themselves on CO2 price changes during extreme
weather events. Note that these concluding remarks apply for for extremely
cold days but not for extremely hot days.
Energy and temperatures with sectoral production model
As explained in Section 2, the arbitrage between economic activity and the
net short/long position within each sector serves as a guide for the comments
of Table 6 with energy variables, temperatures and sectoral production indices.
When confronted with multicollinearity, results are presented in separate mod-
els. As the main comment, losing signiﬁcance on the structural break dummy
break1 at both aggregated and country levels indicates sectoral analysis con-
tributes to a sharper explanation of the April, 2006 break.
Similar results are obtained for the electricity production sector at the ag-
gregated Elecgaseu27 and country levels obtained in France (Elecgasfr), Italy
(Elecgasit) and the UK (Elecgasuk). At the aggregated level (Table 6, row
(10a)), Elecgaseu27 is signiﬁcant at 5% and positive which may be explained
by a declining economic activity trend18. In France, the stable combustion eco-
nomic activity, despite a sharp downturn toward the end of the period, combined
with a net long position contribute to explain its positive sign (row (13)) at 1%.
In the UK, the positive coeﬃcient reveals the combustion net short position has
more eﬀect than its decreasing activity trend at 5% (row (16a)). In Italy, the
combustion net short position creates an allowance scarcity explaining the pos-
itive coeﬃcient found at 10% despite a relatively declining activity trend (row
(14)).
Cement, whose inputs are highly CO2-intensive, is only statistically signiﬁ-
cant for the aggregated level (row (10b)) and France (row (13)). CementEU27
negatively impacts EUA price changes at 10% following a decreasing activity
trend since January, 2007. The same result applies for France where the cement
17sector is characterized by a balanced net position and a stable activity trend.
The paper and board sector is statistically signiﬁcant in several countries. In
Germany, activity peaks in this sector (Paperde)coupled with a net long posi-
tion negatively impact allowance price changes at 10% (row (11)). In Spain, the
paper industry (Paperes)has a negative impact at 5% (row (12)): the deprim-
ing eﬀect of its net long position overwhelms its increasing activity trend. In
Italy, this sector (Paperit)is positive and signiﬁcant at 10% (row (14)). It may
be explained by activity ﬂuctuations and its net short position. Economic ac-
tivity varies between countries which explains why we obtain both positive and
negative coeﬃcients for the same sector depending on the country considered.
Other remarkable inﬂuences of sectoral economic activity include chemicals
and coke ovens. In the UK, the chemicals sector (Chemuk)has an especially
strong impact since, with an increasing activity trend, it negatively aﬀects EUA
price changes at 1% (row (16b)). To a lesser extent, a negative impact of the
chemicals sector in Poland (Chempl), which has a stable economic activity, is
found at 10% (row (15b)). Cokepl is negative and signiﬁcant at 5% due to its
net long position despite an increasing activity trend (row (15a)).
The Energy and temperatures with sectoral production model is especially
rich in Italy (row (14)): two statistically signiﬁcant sectors were added to those
commented above. Cokeit positively impact EUA price changes at 5% and is
characterized by activity ﬂuctuations. Finally, Glassit is at 10% which may be
explained by a relatively net short position and strong economic ﬂuctuations.
As evidence of the April, 2006 structural change has been shown in the
Energy model results in Section 4.1, we turn to the analysis of the two main
periods in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.2 Before the compliance break (July, 2005 - April, 2006)
Energy model
Results of eq.(1) are presented in Table 4 (row (3)). The adjusted R-squared
is equal to 11%. All diagnostic tests are validated. gas, coal, spark and dark are
non signiﬁcant whereas brent, electricity and switch are signiﬁcant and positive.
Both brent price19 and electricity are signiﬁcant at 5%. The sign of switch,
signiﬁcant at 10%, is conform to what has been explained in section 2. During
the EU ETS ﬁrst year, agents needed time to discover real price drivers. Thus,
the carbon market was largely inﬂuenced by the electricity power market since
its participants are the main traders on the carbon market.
Like Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), we uncover the positive impact of
brent lagged one and the lack of signiﬁcance for coal on carbon price changes.
Some of their results are opposite since they show a positive coeﬃcient for gas
18and the non signiﬁcance of their equivalent switch variable. Yet, since the coal
price is relatively stable over the time period considered, having switch signiﬁ-
cant and not gas carries the same information as having gas signiﬁcant only. We
ﬁnd overall the same energy fundamentals as Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007)
during the ”before the compliance break” period.
Energy and temperatures model
Results of eq.(2) and (3) are presented in Table 4 (row (4a) and (4b)).
Compared to full period results, Tempext95 remains not signiﬁcant at 10%. On
the contrary, Tempext5 becomes signiﬁcant at 5% and its sign is positive: the
cooler the weather, the higher EUA price changes.
Concerning results of eq.(3) (row (4b)), Win06 becomes signiﬁcant at 10%.
Its positive sign is consistent with previous literature concerning extremely cold
events.
Energy and temperatures with sectoral production model
Results of eq.(4) are presented in Table 7. At the aggregated level, we do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcant relationships between EUA price changes and sectoral economic
activity. Compared to the full period, we observe similar results for the glass
sector in Italy (Glassit) in row (18) and add the signiﬁcance of one sector in
Germany. Indeed, in row (17) we observe at 10% a negative coeﬃcient for the
cement industry (Cementde)which is characterized by a net long position and
a rather stable economic cycle. Yet it is not possible to include the Win06
temperature dummy variable, maybe due to the fact that these climatic events
and the sectoral variable under consideration are collinear. In other countries,
we were not able to identify any sectoral inﬂuences besides energy variables.
4.3 After the compliance break (June, 2006 - April, 2007)
Energy model
Results of eq.(1) are presented in Table 5 (row (5)). The adjusted R-squared
is equal to 22%. Following Section 4.1, the break 2 dummy is re-introduced to
verify the presence of another structural change starting on October 26, 2006
within ”the after compliance break” period as revealed by the Chow tests (Table
2). Actually, this dummy variable is now signiﬁcant at 5% and negative.
Compared to the full period, gas and coal become not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, whereas switch becomes positive and signiﬁcant at 10%. Energy funda-
mentals are similar between these two periods since switch may be interpreted
as a shadow price of natural gas and coal. Besides, electricity, spark and dark
remain signiﬁcant with the same sign and brent becomes a positive determinant
19of EUA price changes at 1%. On the contrary, Energy fundamentals are more
CO2 prices drivers during the "after compliance break" period than during the
"before compliance break" period. The publication of 2005 veriﬁed emissions
creates a behavioral change among market participants given that they had no
clear indication about their net short/long position.
Energy and temperatures model
Results of eq.(2) and (3) are presented in Table 5 (row (6a) and (6b)). Con-
cerning eq.(2) estimates, only Tempext5 is signiﬁcant and its sign is negative.
Results of eq.(3) estimates indicate only Win07 is signiﬁcant at 5% and its sign
is also negative. Comparing results of eq.(2) during the ”before the compliance
break” period and the ”after the compliance break” period a priori leads to
conclude to the non-robustness of the sign of extremely cold events. Actually,
the analysis of eq.(3) estimates during these two periods explains the Tempext5
sign change. The lower quintile of the European temperature index (Tempext5)
corresponds, for the most part, to January and February, 2006 during the ”be-
fore the compliance break” period and to January and February, 2007 during
the ”after the compliance break” period. As explained above, the former winter
was a very cold winter whereas the latter winter was hot ter than seasonal av-
erages in Europe. Both interaction variables Win06 and Win07 are signiﬁcant
during respectively the ”before the compliance break” period and the ”after the
compliance break” period. The sign of Win06 is positive whereas the sign of
Win07 is negative. These results indicate that extreme cooling days do have an
impact on CO2 price changes. The sign of this impact depends on deviations of
temperatures from their seasonal average and not on temperatures themselves.
When extremely cold events are colder (hotter) than expected, power gener-
ators have to produce more (less) than they forecasted which conducts to an
increase (decrease) of allowances demand and ﬁnally to an increase (decrease)
of CO2 price changes. Forecasting errors on temperatures seem to matter more
than temperature themselves during extremely cold events when one tests for
the inﬂuence of climatic events on CO2 price changes.
Energy and temperatures with sectoral production model
Results of eq.(4) are presented in Table 7. Compared to the full period,
we observe similar results only for the French electricity production sector
(Elecgasfr)(row (21))20. Except for Germany and France, losing signiﬁcance on
Break 2 strenghthens our analysis with production indices as explained above.
Among new results, the glass industry has a signiﬁcant impact at 10% in
Germany (Glassde)and at 5% in France (Glassfr). In Germany, the positive
coeﬃcient is explained by the net long position and a stable activity trend (row
20(20)). In France, an opposite conclusion is reached: Glassfr negatively aﬀects
EUA price changes due to a net long position and activity peaks (row (21)).
Besides, the coke ovens sector emerges as a signiﬁcant determinant of EUA
price changes in the Eurozone (Cokeeuro)and the UK (Cokeuk), both at 5%.
At the aggregated level, the negative coeﬃcient is explained by a rather stable
economic activity with peaks toward the end of the period (row (19)). The
UK sector is characterized by strong economic ﬂuctuations and a balanced net
position which explains its negative sign (row (23)). Note also that due to
colinearity with the Glassde and Cokeuk, Win07 cannot be included but it is
signiﬁcant at 1% in the Eurozone.
In Italy, strong econonomic ﬂuctuations in the cement sector (Cementit)
negatively aﬀect EUA price changes despite a net short position (row (22)).
Metalit positively impacts the allowance price due to a net short position and
an increasing activity trend.
As evidence of the October, 2006 structural change has been shown in the
”Energy model” results in Section 4.3, we turn to the analysis of the two sub-
periods in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
4.3.1 June, 2006 - October, 2006
EUA prices are disconnected from almost all types of fundamentals during this
speciﬁc period. Results of eq.(1), presented in Table 5 (row (7)), highlight
market participants’ wait-and-see behaviour since no energy variables except
brent inﬂuence EUA price changes. They integrate in their expectations the
revelation of the global long position at the installation level. Furthermore,
they are expecting the 2008-2012 NAPs validation by the EC. Market agents
are sensitive to the diﬀusion of these new information. Neither temperatures
nor sectoral production variables have been EUA price changes drivers.
4.3.2 October, 2006 - April, 2007
Energy model
Results of eq.(1) are presented in Table 5 (row (8)). After the ﬁrst com-
pliance and EC decisions on 2008-2012 allocation, EUA price changes respond
to the same energy variables as during the ”after the compliance break” period
(row (5)) in a context of fuel prices decrease. This situation reﬂects a delayed
adjustment of the EUA market to the Brent price peak, as explained by market
specialists.
Energy and temperatures model
21Results of eq.(2) and (3) are presented in Table 5 (row (9a) and (9b)). As
during the ”after the compliance break ” period, results indicate only extremely
cold events have a statistically signiﬁcant and negative impact on carbon price
changes. As explained above, the negative sign of Win07 highlights it is not
temperatures themselves but forecast errors which have an impact on CO2 price
changes during extreme weather events.
Energy and temperatures with sectoral production model
Results of eq.(4) are presented in Table 8. Compared to the full period,
similar results are found for Glassde (row (25a)), Elecgasfr (row (26a)), Cokeit
and Glassit (row (27a))21. Compared to the ”after compliance break” period,
similar results are found for Cokeeuro (row (24a)) and Metalit (row (27b)).
Among new results, Metaleuro has a positive impact on EUA prices at 5%
due to a strong economic activity (row (24b)). Similarly, Metalde with a net
long position and a slightly increasing economic activity has a positive coeﬃ-
cient (row (25b)). Finally, Chemfr positively aﬀect EUA prices at 5% despite
economic downturns (row (26b)).
As a global conclusion, the eﬀects of sectoral production on EUA price
changes are not linear. If the combustion sector appears to be the main driver
over the full period sample, this relationship does not hold in ﬁrst period while
in second period the negative impact of the coke ovens sector has been empha-
sized. At the country level, most relationships hold between the whole period
and subsequent sub-periods for the paper and board industry in Germany, the
combustion sector in France, the coke ovens and glass sectors in Italy. In the case
of France, sectoral production impacts match closely the impacts at the aggre-
gated level. Finally, the sectoral production analysis seems especially relevant
in Italy where a wide variety of sectors have been identiﬁed as key determinants
of EUA prices.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
The EUA price collapse that occurred on April, 2006 after the ﬁrst compliance
of highlights the necessity to understand the underlying mechanisms of carbon
price changes. Theoretical studies identiﬁed three types of fundamentals: en-
ergy prices, weather inﬂuences and economic growth. The empirical analysis of
the daily spot carbon price conducted in this article clearly identiﬁes these fun-
damentals during the EU ETS pilot phase (2005-2007) and besides the inﬂuence
of the institutional context.
The main result features drivers of carbon price changes vary before and af-
22ter two structural breaks on April, 2006 following the disclosure of 2005 veriﬁed
emissions and on October, 2006 following the European Commission announce-
ment of stricter Phase II allocation. It emphasizes the existence of diﬀerent
fundamentals as a consequence of the revelation of institutional information.
These results suggest before the revelation of the net short/long emission po-
sition by country on April, 2006, allowance trading was based on heterogenous
anticipations prior to information disclosure since EUA prices do react to some,
but not all, mechanisms that has been highlighted for the full period.
First, our results point out that energy drivers change over 2005-2007. Brent,
Natural gas, Coal, Electricity, Clean Dark, Clean Spark and Switch prices all
impact signiﬁcantly carbon spot prices, but their inﬂuence vary following the
structural breaks and the sub-periods under consideration.
Second compared to previous literature, the analysis on temperatures in-
ﬂuences is extended by considering not only extreme temperatures, but also
unanticipated temperature changes by market agents. First, we retrieve pre-
vious literature results showing the non-linearity of the relationship between
temperatures and carbon price changes. Second, we show that forecasting er-
rors on temperatures matter more than temperature themselves on CO2 price
changes during extreme weather. Note that these concluding remarks only hold
for extremely cold days and not for extremely hot days.
Finally, this article brings in a new line of research by showing that EUA
price changes also react to economic activity of the main sectors covered by the
EU ETS as inﬂuenced by their emissions net short/long position. Other areas
for future research include the eﬀects of precipitation and wind speed on energy
demand and EUA price changes.
On April, 2007 the second compliance disclosed that veriﬁed emissions were
about 30 million tons or 1.45% lower than the 2006 allocation. In a context
of the impossible transfers of allowances from Phase I to Phase II, the EUA
spot price seems to react to this new information by moving towards zero. The
Phase II spot price now serves as a guide for investors on the medium and long
term to conduct to less CO2-intensive production processes.
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23Notes
1See the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/, accessed on August, 2007.
2CO2 price changes are deﬁned as the ﬁrst log-diﬀerenced carbon price series pt = ln(Pt/Pt−1),
with Pt the daily EUA spot price at time t.
3NAPs determine the total quantity of allowances allocated to installations.
4For an extensive literature review on this topic, see Li and Sailor (1995); Springer (2003);
Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007).
5The main sector whose share is the largest in terms of emissions covered by the EU ETS in
Phase I is the power sector, which accounts for over 50% of emissions capped by the scheme.
Their emissions abatement costs are assumed to be the lowest compared to others sectors,
notably through fuel switching from coal to gas (Reinaud, 2007).
6i.e. all allowances need to be surrendered by the end of December, 2007.
7Thereby reﬂecting the fact that most energy needs are met by forward contracting.
8Their GAUSS codes may be found at
http://www.cba.ua.edu/ jlee/gauss/, accessed on August, 2007.
9The model with one structural change in the intercept or level of the time series provides
an estimated breakpoint on October, 26th 2006.
10The EU Environment Commissionner, Stavos Dimas, said on October 23, 2006 that ac-
cording to the EC calculations, allocation plans submitted for Phase II seek to allocate 15%
more allowances than the amount that would cover the same countriesâĂŹ2005 emissions.
11As calculated by the Caisse des Dépôts–Climate Task Force for Tendances carbone. The
methodology is available on the website http://www.caissedesdepots.fr, accessed on August,
2007.
12Detailed results of the unit root tests are available upon request to the authors.
13Seasonal averages are calculated between 1986 and 2007.
14Each industrial production index has a base 100 in 2000 and is seasonally adjusted. Clas-
siﬁcation NACE Rev.1 C-F, available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, accessed on August,
2007.
15Speciﬁcally, the index of production and distribution of electricity, gas and heating.
16Using the MATLAB interpolation function by L. Shure. See IEEE (1979) for reference.
17See ”Details on estimation procedures and tables” in Appendix.
18Due to the complexity of the analysis for the EU 27, it appears diﬃcult to further comment
on the net short/long position of this sector.
19This variable is lagged one because it loses its signiﬁcance without lag.
20Note that despite the non-signiﬁcance of spark at 11%, we choose to keep it to preserve
coeﬃcients stability. A reduced model without spark does not change either the sign or the
signiﬁcance of other coeﬃcient estimates.
21Despite the non-signiﬁcance of spark at 11%, it is preserved for the same reasons as
explained in Section 4.3.
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256 Appendix
A. Descriptive and Chow Breakpoint Test Statistics
Full pe-
rioda
Mean Median Max Min Std.
Dev.
Skew. Kurt. N
pt -0.01 0.01 0.30 -0.47 0.06 -1.33 14.71 483
Brent 0.01 0.01 3.76 -2.97 1.07 -0.02 2.80 483
Natural
Gas
0.01 -0.15 11.54 -10.57 1.67 0.99 14.81 483
Coal 0.01 -0.00 0.55 -0.24 0.07 1.29 13.61 483
Switch 0.01 -0.54 42.37 -38.60 6.16 0.97 14.73 483
Electricity 0.01 -0.23 24.99 -19.40 3.78 0.90 15.51 483
Dark 0.01 -0.07 16.05 -11.70 2.09 1.09 19.83 483
Spark 0.01 0.15 13.56 -19.34 3.18 -0.99 10.89 483
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
afor the full period sample with pt the ﬁrst log-diﬀerenced EUA price series, all energy
variables transformed in forecast errors, StdDev. the standard deviation, Skew. the skewness,
Kurt. the kurtosis and N the number of observations.
Full period
Probability F-statistic
Base modela 0.0000 112.1917
”After the compliance break” period
Probability F-statistic
Base modelb 0.0316 16.8623
Table 2: Chow Breakpoint Test statistics
aResults for breakpoints on June 20, 2006 and October 25, 2006.
bResults for breakpoint on October 25, 2006.
6.1 B. Details on estimation procedures and tables
In all tables, the dependent variable is the ﬁrst log-diﬀerenced EUA price series
with pt(−1) and pt(−2) its lagged 1 and 2 values respectively. Other variables
are explained in Section 3. As usual, *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1%, ** at 5%
and * at 10%.
Ordinary least squares estimator with a Newey-West Heteroscedastic-
Consistent Covariance Matrix (HCCM) is used (NW OLS), which corrects resid-
uals to adjust for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Unless otherwise
indicated, all regression results are presented in reduced form. Diﬀerent lags
26were included for energy variables which yield similar results. To simplify the
exposition, we generally present the results without lag except for speciﬁc cases.
As is standard the simple R-squared, the adjusted R-squared, the p-value of
the F-test statistic (F −Stat), the Durbin-Watson statistic (D.W.), the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Criterion (SC) are reported. We
also report three additional diagnostic tests for the quality of the regressions:
the p-value of the the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lagrange Multiplier
test (LM) and the p-value of the White heteroskedasticity test (White test).
Note the White test shows evidence of heteroskedasticity in some NW OLS
estimates, which is a standard result when using daily time-series. When
necessary, we capture this heteroskedasticity by calibrating the data with a
GARCH(p, q) model. For the mean equation we choose the same AR process
from the corresponding equation estimated by NW OLS, while for the vari-
ance equation we test diﬀerent GARCH speciﬁcations. Parameter estimates for
higher orders of p or q are not signiﬁcant for all equations. Thus, we perform
the most commonly used GARCH(1,1) model using Bollerslev-Wooldrige ro-
bust standard errors and covariance. As shown in Table 9, the two estimation
procedures yield similar results in the mean equation with positive coeﬃcient
estimates in the variance equation (ARCH(1) and GARCH(1)). Thus and to
simplify the exposition, our comments are only based on coeﬃcient estimates
obtained from NW OLS.
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R-squ. 0.3543 0.3560 0.3694
Adj. R-squ. 0.3417 0.3407 0.3558
F-Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.W. 1.8892 1.8944 1.8900
LM test 0.1155 0.1277 0.1472
White test 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000
AIC -3.3030 -3.2974 -3.3226
SC -3.2153 -3.1920 -3.2260
Procedure NW OLS NW OLS NW OLS
Table 3: Results of eq.(1),(2),(3)
28”Before the compliance break”




















Natural Gas - - -













Clean Dark - - -








R-squ. 0.1311 0.1346 0.1327
Adj. R-squ. 0.1100 0.1047 0.1072
F-Stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.W. 1.9038 1.9404 1.9257
LM test 0.2306 0.4861 0.2906
White test 0.1113 0.1635 0.1513
AIC -4.6690 -4.6703 -4.6777
SC -4.5740 -4.5433 -4.5665
Procedure NW OLS NW OLS NW OLS
Table 4: Results of eq.(1),(2),(3) continued
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